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THE RATIONALE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK

THE AUTOMOBILE GUEST AND THE RATIONALE OF
ASSUMPTION OF RISK*

By RALPH S. RICEf
VI.

THE OPERATION OF THE CONCEPT AND THE

AUTOMOBILE GUEST

A. As TO THE "DUTY" OF THE DEFENDANT
In the automobile cases, as in other fields where the doctrine
has been applied, confusion has resulted from the use of the
words "assumption of risk" to indicate a limitation on the duty
of the host to observe a certain standard of care for the safety of
his passenger regardless of the conduct of the guest. Where the
liabilities of the parties are determined at common law, the standard of obligation of the host to the guest has arisen from two
principal analogies: that of the gratuitous bailee toward the safety
of his bailment, and that of the licensor to a gratuitous licensee.
The impact of the doctrine on the cases drawing analogies to
the bailor-bailee relationship has been slight, but an understanding of the rationale of those cases is imperative in establishing the
proper place of the doctrine of assumption of risk in contemporary
automobile accident law.
A minority of jurisdictions have sought to measure the responsibility of the host to a guest on the theory that a gratuitous
bailee owes only slight care to preserve the subject of the bailment from harm. This doctrine was enunciated in England in
1869 and was affirmed in 1899.2-3 The rule was subsequently discarded there. 2 3 The doctrine that only slight care was owed
*Continued from 27 M[INNESOTA LAW REVIEW 382.

'Professor of Law, Washburn Municipal University School of Law,
Topeka, Kansas.
223Moffatt v.
Bateman, (1869) L. R. 3 P. C. 115, 22 L. T. 140, and
Coughlin v. Gillison, [1899] 12 Q. B. 145, 68 L. J.Q. B. 147, 79 L. T. 627,
in which the decision in the earlier case was discussed by Smith, L. J.:
"What was there laid down was that if you undertake to drive a man in
your carriage, you must not be guilty of gross negligence in driving, if you
wish to escape liability for an accident to him while being driven." And, as
to the Bateman case, Collins, L. J.said: "The plaintiff had intrusted himself to the defendant to be carried, and there was a clear duty on the part
of the bailee towards the bailor not to be guilty of gross negligence causing
injury to him."
224See Harris v. Perry & Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 219, 72 L. J. K. B. 725,
89 L. T. 174, and Dann v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 108 L. J.K. B.
255, 55 T. L. R. 297, 160 L. T. 433.
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a gratuitous guest was, however, adopted in Georgia in 1871,221
and the basic decision establishing the doctrine in the automobile
cases was enunciated in Massachusetts in 1917.226 The decision
-0
is still followed there,2 2 7 and has been approved in Georgia '2
and
22 9
Washington..
After some wavering, the Virginia court also
adopted the concept, 23 0 and the Pennsylvania court, after seeming
to follow the bailment analogy, subsequently rejected it. 31 The
doctrine has been the target for sharp attacks by other courts and
commentators.2
2 25

22

31.

elp v. Dunn, (1871)

42 Ga. 528.

6Massaletti v. Fitzroy, (1917) 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168. The
decision seems indefensible, both from the standpoint of logic and authority,
and is replete with desperate refinements. An examination of the cases cited,
adopting the licensor-licensee analogy of the real property cases, reveals
that the distinctions from such decisions, sought to be made by the Massachusetts court, are so ill-founded as to reflect on the probity of the mem-

bers of court. The decision was based in part upon the earlier case of West
v. Poor,
(1907) 196 Mass. 183, 81 N. E. 960.
2
27E. g., Terlizzi v. March, (1927)
258 Mass. 156, 154 N. E. 754;
Picarello
v. Rodakis, (1937) 299 Mass. 33, 11 N. E. (2d) 470.
2
08Epps v. Parrish, (1921) 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S. E. 297, and other
cases cited and followed in Hopkins v. Sipe, (1938) 58 Ga. A. 511, 199 S. E.
246. 22
9Saxe v. Terry, (1926) 140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27.
23
OIn Morris v. Peyton, (1927) 148 Va. 812, 139 S.E. 500, the court
apparently adopted the rule that the host owed a duty of reasonable care
toward the automobile guest, in a case in which the guest was a child. The
case was distinguished in Boggs v. Plybon, (1931) 157 Va. 30, 160 S. E. 66,
and Jones v. Massie, (1932) 158 Va. 121, 163 S. E. 63, holding that the
host could be liable to the guest only for gross negligence unless the guest
were "an infant of tender years" who could not be expected to understand
or assume the risk. This distinction was not made in Massachusetts under
the gross negligence rule (Balian v. Ogassian, (1931) 277 Mass. 525, 179
N. E. 232) or in Wisconsin under the assumption of risk doctrine (Eisenhut
v. Eisenhut,
(1933) 212 Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440).
23
'Cody v. Venzie, (1919) 263 Pa. St. 451, 107 Atl. 383: "... when a
gratuitous bailment is for the sole benefit of the guest the law require,
slight diligence and makes the carrier only responsible for gross neglect,
if it is for the sole benefit of the carrier the law requires great diligence
and makes the carrier responsible for slight neglect; and where it is for
the benefit or pleasure of both parties, as in the instant case, it requires
ordinary diligence and makes the carrier responsible for ordinary neglect."
But in Curry v. Riggles, (1931) 302 Pa. St. 156, 153 Atl. 325, where the
defendant was taking the plaintiff to a nearby city to get the plaintiff's car
and an accident happened during the journey, the court said: "The trip
was undertaken for plaintiff's accommodation, and he was a gratuitous passenger, toward whom defendant was required to exercise ordinary care ...
but not the high degree required in the case of the carriage of a passenger
for hire. ..."
232See comments of the court in Wurtzburger v. Oglesby, (1930) 222
Ala. 151, 131 So. 9; Munson v. Rupker, (1923) 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N. E.
169, aff'd 151 N. E. 101, (in the first opinion) ". . . it will not do to say
that the operator of an automobile owes no more duty to a person riding
with him as a guest at sufferance, or as a self-invited guest, than a gratuitous bailee owes to a block of wood," and (in the opinion on rehearing)
"But the analogy between gratuitous bailments of personal property and
the gratuitous transportation of a human being in an automobile does not
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Most courts, however, have sought to determine the liability
of the automobile host to his guest upon principles arising from
the licensor-licensee relationship. The greater number of these
decisions (and others which arbitrarily set the standard of care
without reference to analogies in then existing concepts of legal
fault) suggest that the host owes a duty to his guest to exercise
"ordinary" or "reasonable" care for his safety :235 a standard which
is properly measurable by the conduct of the reasonably prudent
man. Normally the term "assumption of risk" is not found in
cases referable simply to the duty of ordinary care. In some of
the cases involving automobile transportation, the novelty of the
problem was such that in establishing the limits of the duty of
the host it was suggested that the guest "assumes the risks which
would naturally attach to riding," 236 or "assumes all the ordinary
risk of injury from dangers and accidents incident to automobile
travel,'112 3 7 as earlier had been said with reference to railway transportation.23 s The use of the term in defining the liability of the
host in litigation involving airplane carriage has been general
hold. The degree of protection required to be given property rights is not
necessarily the same as that which must be given to human life...

."

And

see, e. g., White, Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger,
(1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 326, 330, ff.
23 5
Perkins v. Galloway, (1915) 194 Ala. 265, 69 So. 875; Howe v.
Little, (1931) 182 Ark. 1083, 34 S. W. (2d) 218; Spring v. McCabe,
(1921) 53 Cal. App. 330, 200 Pac. 41; Boyle v. Dolan (1929) 97 Fla. 249,
120 So. 334; Barnett v. Levy, (1919) 213 Ill. App. 129; Munson v. Rupker,
supra, note 232; Mayberry v. Sivey, (1877) 18 Kan. 291; Beard v. Kiusmeier, (1914) 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319; Avery v. Thompson, (1918)
117 Me. 120, 103 Atl. 4; Cohen v. Silverman, (1922) 153 Minn. 492, 190
N. W. 795; Green v. Maddox, (1935) 168 Miss. 171, 151 So. 160; Nicora
v. Cerveri, (1926) 49 Nev. 261, 244 Pac. 897; Grimshaw v. Lake Shore
& Michigan Southern Ry., (1912) 205 N. Y. 371, 98 N. E. 762, (gratuitous
passenger on common carrier, dicta as to other licensees) ; Amann v. Thurston, (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 293, 231 N. Y. S. 657; Eddy v. Wells, (1930)
59 N. D. 663, 231 N. W. 785; Bauer v. Griess, (1920) 105 Neb. 381, 181
N. W. 156; Zwick v. Zwick, (1928) 20 Ohio App. 522, 163 N. E. 917
(requirement of ordinary care assumed) ; Leonard v. Bartle, (1927) 48
R. I. 101, 135 Atl. 853; Morris v. Sanders, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 55 S.W.
(2d) 594; Moorefield v. Lewis, (1924) 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S. E. 564;
Collins v. Anderson, (1927) 37 Wyo. 275, 260 P. 1089; Lygo v. Newbold,
(1854) 9 Ex. 302, 23 L. J. Ex. 108, 22 L. T. 0. S.226; Harris v. Perry &
Co., (1903) 2 K. B. 219, 72 L. J. K. B. 725, 89 L. T. 174. Cases on the
subject are innumerable, but the ones selected above are representative in
enunciation
and application of the rule.
2
3Roy v. Kirn, (1919) 208 Mich. 571, 175 N. W. 475.
237Green v. Maddox, (1935) 168 Miss. 171, 151 So. 160; later approved
in Monsour v. Farris, (1938) 181 Miss. 803, 181 So. 326. See also Jacobs
v. Jacobs, (1917) 141 La. 272, 74 So. 992, suggesting that a guest must
show negligence on the part of the driver, and that he "assumes the risk of
the ordinary
dangers of which he is aware."
23 8
McKinney v. Neil, (C.C. Ohio 1840) 1 McLean 540, Fed. Cas. No.
8865; Chicago B. & Q. R. v. Hazzard, (1861) 26 Ill. 373.
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and has in effect followed the above cases in using the term to
limit the liability of the host to those cases in which lack of care
23 9

is shown.

The decisions above set the standard of conduct of the host
in automobile guest cases clearly and definitively. Rules adopted
in other decisions have been less exact. It has been suggested that
by merely accepting a ride, one does not assume the risk of the
driver's negligence,2 40 and such conclusion is entirely in accord
with the decisions indicating that a possessor of real property may
not act negligently toward one on his premises after the possessor
knows of the presence of the licensee. But the standard of conduct
disconstituting "negligence" is not thus made clear, and courts
41
agree as to the elements of negligent action in such cases .2
Still less definitive of the respective duties of the parties is the
suggestion often made that the host must not "increase the danger
to the guest or create a new danger.

' 242

Within the uncertain

scope of this definition, it has been held that the guest accepts
the host with the skill the host actually possesses, where the guest
has knowledge of the driving habits of his host, 213 or, without
2

DAllison v. Standard Air Lines, (D.C. Cal.) U. S. Av. R. (1930)
292, aff'd on appeal, 65 F. (2d) 668, without specific reference to the term;
Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, (D.C. Pa.) U. S. Av. R. (1931)
205; Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, (1932) 236 App. Div. 664, 257 N. Y. S.
1010; Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, (1934) 242 App. Div. 625,
271 N. Y. S. 1107, aff'd without reference to this language of the decision
in (1935)
266 N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692.
240
See Marks v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 Atl. 83, holding
that one does not assume the risk of negligence of another because the
other has been previously negligent. Williamson v. Fitzgerald, (1931) 116
Cal. App. 19, 2 P. (2d) 201: "... . it may not be said the plaintiff assumed
the risks of danger from the negligent conduct in driving merely because
she voluntarily became a member of the expedition. One does not ordinarily
no reason to anticipate."
assume
2 41 the risk of dangers he has
The duty of the host toward the guest has since been said by the
California court to be that of ordinary care. See Spring v. McCabe, (1921)
53 Cal. App. 330, 200 Pac. 41. An instruction of the trial court that the
guest did not "assume the risks of any negligence or any failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of [the driver]" was approved in Peay v.
Panich, (1935) 191 Ark. 538, 87 S. W. (2d) 23, the instruction also limiting the right to recover where the conduct of the plaintiff in riding with a
known
incompetent driver indicated an assumption of risk.
24 2
Barger v. Chelpon, (1932) 60 S. D. 66, 243 N. W. 97. See also
Ingerick v. Mess, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 233; Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Parcq, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 678;
Perkins v. Galloway, (1915) 194 Ala. 265, 69 So. 875; Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., (1922) 98 Conn. 87, 118 AtI. 518; Roy v. Kirn, (1919) 208
Mich. 571, 175 N. W. 475; Higgins v. Mason, (1930) 255 N. Y. 104, 174
N. E. 77; Leonard v. Bartle, (1927) 48 R. I. 101, 135 Atl. 853; Harrison
v. Graham, 21 Tenn. App. 189, 107 S. W. (2d) 517; and a line of Wisconsin cases, the most recent of which appears to be Bourestom v. Bourestom, (1939) 231 Wis. 666, 285 N. W. 426.
243Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Parcq, supra note 242.
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qualification, that the guest accepts the host as he is ;244 or that
the host owes the guest the duty of ordinary or reasonable care. 245
Here, too, the term has been used to denote that the guest "assumes the risk" of those hazards concerning which the host owes
him no duty of protection. "46 And in one of the earlier cases in
which analogy was drawn to the licensor-licensee cases involving
real property, the court arrived at the conclusion that the guest
"as a licensee, assumed all the risks of the carriage, except such
as might result from wanton or intentional wrong, or a failure
to exercise due care to avert injury after his danger became apparent,"2'

a combination of the wanton or wilful misconduct

theory and that of last clear chance.
A principal variation from the more generally accepted requirement that the host must act as a reasonably prudent man is
the principle that the automobile guest must not only take the
vehicle of the host as he finds it (a clearly proper conclusion from
the real property cases holding that the possessor owes no duty
to a licensee or trespasser to put the premises in shape for his use)
but that he must also take the host as he finds him. This suggestion was first casually made in Connecticut in- 1922,248 where
it was said that "The guest on entering the automobile takes it
and the driver as they then are, and accepts the dangers incident
to that mode of conveyance." The comment was reiterated during
the following year by the Indiana court in the case of Munson v.
Rupker,'' which also often has been cited as holding that the
automobile host owes the same duty to an invitee as to a guest
2-Ingerick v. Mess, Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., Higgins v. Mason,
and Bourestom v. Bourestom, all cited supra note 242.
"45Perkins v. Galloway, supra note 235; Roy v. Kirn, supra note 236.
Leonard v. Bartle, supra note 235; Barger v. Chelpon, supra note 242;
Harrison
v. Graham, (1937) 21 Tenn. App. 189, 107 S. W. (2d) 517.
2
',The use of the term "assumption of risk" in limiting the duty of
the defendant was well considered in Eddy v. Wells, (1930) 59 N. D. 663,
231 N. W. 785, in which it was held that the host must use ordinary care
not to increase the hazards of the guest: "It must be recognized, however,
that there is a popular sense in which the term 'assumption of risk' is being
used, and this isbecoming noticeable in current automobile litigation. Some
of the courts have used this language in such cases at times in a sense different from that which the term has commonly borne in legal parlance. And
latterly many of the 'catch phrase' writers in the various law reports have
used the term in this way. An automobile owner who gives his friend a ride
isnot an insurer of that friend's safety. The relation of host and guest
ensues. The friend becomes a guest subject to the hazards reasonably incident to such a use of such a vehicle. The host must use and exercise ordinary care, considering all of the circumstances, so as not to increase such
hazards
2 7 ......
'l Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., (1921) 206 Ala. 71, 89 So. 285.
2
4'1n Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., (1922) 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518.
2ISCited supra note 235.
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at sufferance. In that case the court, apparently in an unguarded
moment, said: "He who enters an automobile to take a ride with
the owner also takes the automobile and the driver as he finds
them. But, when the owner of the automobile starts it in motion
he, as it were, takes the life of his guest into his keeping, and in
the operation of such car he must use reasonable care not to
injure any one riding therein with his knowledge and consent."
The latter part of the quotation clearly sets up the standard of
"reasonable care," but the case says nothing concerning how the
term "reasonable" is to be interpreted.
If the term is to be interpreted to mean what is "reasonable"
for the driver as he is, the standard may be quite different from
that of the fictitious "reasonably prudent man" of the other fields
of negligence. The potentialities of this decision have not been
developed in Indiana, but the looseness of the language was
noted by the Connecticut court in the case of Marks v. Dorkin, 2'
in which it was specifically said that the guest not only did not
"accept" the risk of the unknown incompetence of the driver.
but that he did not assume any risk of known habits of reckless driving. The conclusion that a guest takes the driver as he
finds him was adopted by the Arkansas court in two cases, 51
citing Munson v. Rupker, but no case has there arisen directly
involving the principle that the guest assumes the risk of injuries
through the lack of skill of the host. In a more recent case, the
court held that the guest assumes the risk of the knoun incompetence of the driver2-52 (which of course pertains to the "conduct"
of the guest rather than a limitation of the "duty" of the driver)
and from the opinion it seems likely that in Arkansas the doctrine
will be applied only to the incompetence of the driver which is
known to the guest, and not that with which the guest may be
unfamiliar. The suggestion of Munson v. Rupker has also been
quoted with approval by the West Virginia court in a case
not involving incompetence of the driver, but there have been no
later cases interpretive of the phrase.22 3 In still other opinions.
judges have indicated a conviction that the guest ought be said
to "assume the risks" arising out of the lack of driving skill of
25OMarks
v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 Atl. 83.
251
Black v. Goldweber, (1927) 172 Ark. 862, 291 S. W. 760; Howe v.
Little, (1931) 182 Ark. 1083, 34 S. W. (2d) 218, each citing (as dicta) the
statement in Munson v. Rupker (1926) 96 Ind. App. 15, 151 N. E. 101, that
"He who enters an automobile to take a ride with the owner also takes the
automobile
and the driver as he finds them."
252
Peay v. Panich, (1935) 191 Ark. 538, 37 S. W. (2d) 23.
25
3Marple v. Haddad, (1927) 103 W. Va. 508, 138 S. E. 113.
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the host,-5-4 whether such lack of skill was known or unknown
to the passenger.
The doctrine, if it may be said to be such, that the guest
"takes" or "accepts" or "assumes" the risks of travel arising
from the personal characteristics of the driver, whether known
or unknown to the guest, has been innocuous in the cases heretofore cited, for it does not appear that the courts have in fact
limited the rights of the guest by the suggestions made. In two
states, however, the doctrine has impinged sharply on the right
of litigants. The concept has been extensively applied in Wisconsin, where the court has held that while the host owes a duty
to the guest not to increase the hazards known to him when he
embarks upon the journey, the guest is charged with knowledge
that driving abilities vary and that the host may be less able to
protect him than a driver of more skill and experience.2 55 It is
therefore said that in conscientiously exercising his best skill,
the host has violated no duty owed to the guest, though the
standard of care which he is able to attain is less than that of the
average reasonably prudent man. The social justification for such
rule was presented in an exhaustive opinion by the courts:
"When one drives his car to his neighbor's door and invites
his neighbor to an automobile ride, does not the neighbor accept
the hospitality which the host has to offer? . . . When he accepts
-5'Harvey, J., in Howse v. Weinrich, (1931) 133 Kan. 132, 298 Pac.
766: "One who invites another to ride in his car does not thereby necessarily guarantee either that he is an expert driver or that his car is in first
class condition. The guest ordinarily is bound to know that he is being
invited to ride in a used car, the tires, brakes, lights and other working
parts of which may not be in first class condition, and that his host may not
be an expert driver. In accepting the invitation the guest necessarily assumes
risks normally incident to such condition much as a guest invited to a home
assumes the risk of the condition of the premises and the characteristics of
his host"; (and see majority opinion of Burch, J., in the same case) ; Brogden, J., in Norfleet v. Hall, (1933) 204 N. C. 573, 169 S. E. 143: (after
considering the analogy between defective automobiles and defective premises) ". . . it would seem that the driver is as much a permanent condition
of moving premises as bolts and screws, and valves and tubes. If the rider
assumes the risk of such bolts and tubes and valves, it is hard to understand
why he does not also accept the risk of the driver, who must be a permanent part of the 'premises' of a moving vehicle, for without the driver, the
vehicle would not move at all. The analogy [that a duty of ordinary care
is owed in automobile cases because the vehicle is inherently dangerous,
hence a higher duty of care is owed than to retain premises in a proper
condition] strikes me as an effort to put new wine in old bottles, and the
fallacy of that experiment was pointed out about two thousand years ago."
It will be noted that not all cases use the term "assume the risk." Some
courts speak of "accepting" the risk; others of "taking" the driver as he is
found. Whatever terminology is used, the reference to the general principle
behind the cases seems clear.
-55"See Sommerfield v. Flury, (1929) 198 Wis. 163, 223 N. W. 408:
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the invitation and enters the automobile does he not accept the
car in the condition in which it exists and such skill as may be
possessed on the part of the driver? That there is a great variation in the degree of skill possessed by those who assume to
drive cars is well known. Not all who drive automobiles by any
manner of means can be said to be expert drivers. The danger
thus assumed is the danger that should not be increased and to
which the host should add no new danger. If the host driving
the car conscientiously exercised the skill possessed by him in
handling the car under emergencies, does the guest have a right
to demand any more? Does the guest have a right to demand
of the host a degree of skill for the security of the guest which
the host is utterly unable to exercise for his own protection? It
would seem that the statement of this question carried with it
its own answer, and that the same consideration which compels
the guest to accept the car in the condition in which he finds it
also compels him to be content with the honest and conscientious
exercise of such skill as the host or driver may have attained in
the management and control of the automobile in emergencies." 2 56
It should be noted that the liability of the host is extended,
however, in cases in which he does not conscientiously exercise
the skill possessed, 257 and that the guest does not assume the
risk of an accident caused by inadvertence, 28 as distinguished
from lack of skill. Neither does the guest assume the risk of
absence of skill of the host, when faulty or hasty judgment of
the driver is based on unsound premises proceeding from careless observationY50
The doctrine has been adopted with equal rigor in New York,
where it has been applied in a case where the host failed, as a
reasonably prudent man obviously would not have failed, to realize
that a known defective condition in the automobile was dangerous.
The court found that the guest assumed the risk of the inability
256
Cleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267. In this case,
however, it appeared that the guest had actual knowledge of the lack of
skill of the host in operating the automobile involved in the accident. In
Poneitowcki v. Harres, (1929) 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W. 126, it was held
that the guest accepted the driver, with his habits of driving, so far as
the same were known to her, and with such skill in operating and managing
the car as he actually possessed. The limitation on the duty of the host,
excluding liability for lack of skill in operating the automobile, was definitely stated and applibd, however, in Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, (1933) 212
Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440, reh. den. 212 Wis. 467, 250 N. W. 441.
2
.5Gleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267; Hensel v.
Hensel Yellow Cab Co., (1932) 209 Wis. 489, 245 N. W. 159; Monsos v.
Euler, (1934) 2i6 Wis. 133, 256 N. W. 630.
258
Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co., (1932) 209 Wis. 489, 245 N. W.
159. 259 Rudolph v. Ketter, (1940) 233 Wis. 329, 289 N. W. 674.
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of the host to appreciate the danger, even though such propensity
0
26
of the host was unknown to him.

The fact that only two states have adopted this extensive
limitation on the duty of the host is illustrative of the shortcomings inherent in the rule. The rule has always been well
established in tort that one assuming to act must exercise reasonable care in so acting. It is said that the host "must conscientiously
exercise the skill possessed"; yet it may be next to impossible to
prove objectively that the host failed so to exercise his skill,
where the presumption against his willingness to subject himself to a risk of harm obtains. The difficulty in proof is manifest,
especially since the Wisconsin court has upon occasion based
its decisions on the factor that the host could not be expected to
intend to injure himself. 261 Moreover, if, as the maxims repeat,
"conjecture and speculation are abhorrent to the law," what
shall be said of a petit jury in a personal injury suit struggling
to decide whether the accident occurred because the host had only
limited skill, or because he did not "conscientiously exercise" the
skill he had? The courts themselves can never say. If the driver
has gone around corners on two wheels all his life, unknown to
his guest, shall the fact that this was the standard of care he
normally observed, and that he exercised the quantum of skill he
possessed, preclude a recovery by the guest? Shall there be as
many standards of legal fault in these cases as there are automobile drivers? What remains of the basis of the salutary doctrine in automobile accident cases that each man may presume
that another will act as a reasonably prudent man, or that he will
obey the law, until he has actual or constructive knowledge that
does or ought lead him to conclude otherwise? Fundamentally,
the doctrine is unrealistic. The guest does not in fact, when he
accepts the hospitality, accept the risk that the host will act other
than as a reasonably prudent man.
The result of the doctrine in the Wisconsin court was the
adoption of the fiction that lookout, speed, and obedience to the
")Higgins v. Mason, (1930) 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77, where it was
clear that Mason, the driver of the vehicle, knew something was wrong with
it: "Mason's failure to realize . . .a dangerous condition . .. was a risk
assumed by the guests when they accepted the invitation to take the trip."
And 2see
Campbell v. Spaeth, (1934) 213 Wis. 162, 250 N. W. 394.
3
1E.g., Hensel v. Hensel, supra, note 257: (in deciding whether the host
could have intended to injure himself, in determining causation for an accident) "There is nothing to indicate that the driver Hensel did not exercise
such skill as he possessed in the management of the truck. He had every
inducement to do so. His own safety as well as that of his wife and em-

ployee were at stake as well as the property of the company...."
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law of the road require no experience or acquired skill, and that
the driver of an automobile who failed to maintain a lookout,
obey the laws of the road, or drive at a proper speed increased
the hazard to his guest.2-62 Consequently it was said that as to
these factors, the guest assumed no risk. Yet, if a driver is
unskillful at all, by lack of experience, he is likely to drive either
too fast or too slow, and to encounter peril from lack of experience or judgment in making observations or drawing conclusions from them. There seems no logical reason for including these features of the driving abilities of the host among the
risks not assumed by the guest if it may be shown that the host
was conscientiously exercising such skill as he possessed in keeping watch over the way of travel. The exception seems based
rather on considerations of policy than upon logic.
However, other factors equally independent of the driver's
background of skill and experience have been considered not to
be within the scope of his obligation to the guest. 63 Even conceding the social desirability of this limitation of the duty of
the host, it well may be questioned whether the administrative
and judicial inconsistencies inseparable from it do not outweigh
the social objectives sought to be obtained. If "assumption of
risk" of the lack of skill of the host, unknown to the passenger,
be considered a definitive doctrine, it would therefore seem that
courts which have adopted it as dicta ought carefully to explore
the potentialities of the concept before extending the rule to circumstances in which it may be determinative of the rights of
the litigants.
Principles heretofore considered in this section relate to the
limitations upon the duty of the host in so far as his operation of
the automobile is concerned. Where the analogy to the real property cases is drawn, however, it seems clear that it may properly
be said that the guest "assumes the risk" of the defects in the
vehicle itself, or, to state the rule more exactly, that the automobile host, like the possessor of real property, owes the guest no
duty to make the vehicle safe for the reception of guests, but
only to warn the guests of dangers in the vehicle with which he
262See cases cited at note 289 infra, and text.
3E.g., where a driver is unable to keep a car from running off the
highway. Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, (1933) 212 Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440. See
comment by Professor Campbell on this subject, suggesting the absence
of a guiding principle in such cases. Campbell, Work of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court for the August, 1933, and January, 1934, Term, Ch. VIII.
Negligence, (1934) 10 Wis. L. Rev. 67, 69, 70.
26
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is familiar. The cases generally so hold, 2 64 although many of them
do not refer to the problem in terms of "assumption of risk" by
the guest of the perils arising out of defects in the vehicle unknown to the host. This is the more surprising not only because
the corollary to the real property cases is obvious, but because
Priestly v. Fowcler, first establishing a limitation of the duty of
the host as to vehicular defects, dealt specifically, albeit confusedly,
with the doctrine.2 6 The phrase has, however, been used in sug-

gesting that the host owed the guest a duty to inform him of a
defective tire,' " or accelerator, 267 as well as where the "guest"
was in custody of the law. -65
It must be apparent from the above that in so far as the term
.assumption of risk" relates to the duty of the host toward the
guest, in any field, the phrase is descriptive rather than definitive.
If the words "assumption of risk" were dropped from the vocabu" 4The early English case of Moffatt v. Bateman, (1869) L. R. 3 P. C.
115, 22 L. T. 140, based on the bailor-bailee theory of responsibility in
vehicular host-guest relationships, so held. Most courts require that actual
knowledge of the host be shown: Howe v. Little, (1932) 182 Ark. 1083, 34
S. W. (2d) 218; Shrigley v. Pierson, (1934) 189 Ark. 386, 72 S. W. (2d)
541; Peay v. Panich, (1935) 191 Ark. 538, 37 S. W. (2d) 23; Dickerson v.
Connecticut Co., (1922) 98 Conn. 87, 118 At. 518; Coffey v. Ouchita River
Lbr. Co., (La. App. 1941) 191 So. 561; Monsour v. Farris, (1938) 181
Miss. 803, 181 So. 326; Dickason v. Dickason, (1929) 84 Mont. 52, 274 Pac.
145; Patnode v. Foote, (1912) 153 App. Div. 494, 138 N. Y. S. 221, (horses
ran away, injuring plaintiff) ; Carroll v. Yonkers, (1920) 193 App. Div. 655,
184 N. Y. S. 847; Joyce v. Brockett, (1923) 205 App. Div. 770, 200 N. Y. S.
394; Higgins v. Mason, (1930) 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77; Pettys v.
Leith, (1933) 63 S. D. 149, 252 N. W. 18; Marple v. Haddad, (1927) 103
W. Va. 508, 138 S. E. 113; O'Shea v. Lavoy, (1921) 175 Wis. 456, 185
N. V. 525; Poneitowcki v. Harres, (1929) 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W. 126;
Waters v. Markham, (1931) 204 Wis. 332, 235 N. W. 797; Sweet v.
Underwriters' Casualty Company, (1932) 206 Wis. 447, 240 N. W. 199;
Campbell v. Spaeth, (1934) 213 Wis. 162, 250 N. W. 394.
A few courts have held that the host will be liable if he should have
known, or by exercise of reasonable care could have discovered, the defective condition of the automobile: Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co.,
(1941) 136 Me. 284, 8 Atl. (2d) 393; Banta v. Moresi, (1928) 9 La. App.
636, 119 So. 900; but cf. Coffey v. Ouchita Lbr. Co., (La. App. 1941) 191
So. 561; Romansky v. Cestaro, (1929) 109 Conn. 654, 145 At. 156. Of
course, where the defective condition is known to the guest, the host need
take no steps to advise of it. Pettys v. Leith, (1933) 63 S. D. 149, 252
N. W. 18; Llewellyn v. Schott, (1930) 109 W. Va. 379, 155 S. W. 115.
The Wisconsin court has also held that mere knowledge of a defect is
not sufficient; that realization that the defective condition involves danger
to the guest must also be shown: Waters v. Markham, (1931) 204 Wis.
332, 235 N. W. 797; Campbell v. Spaeth, (1934) 213 Wis. 162, 250 N. W.
394. 2 3
' Priestly v. Fowler, (1837)

3 M. & W. 1, Murp. & H. 305, 7 L. J.
Ex. 42. See Professor Bohlen's analysis of the case in Voluntary Assumption of Risk, (1906) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14, 27, 28.
-"6Knutson v. Dilger, (1934) 62 S. D. 474, 253 N. W. 459.
-o7Hennig v. Booth, (1926) 4 N. J. Supp. 150, 132 At. 294.
26
sRusso v. State, (1938) 166 Misc. Rep. 316, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 350.
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lary of the courts, it is doubtful that there would be any change
in established legal principles governing the relationship of host
and guest, whether in the real property or the automobile cases.
B.

ASSUMPTION OF
OF THE

RISK

"CONDUCT"

AS A BAR TO RECOVERY BECAUSE

OF THE AUTOMOBILE

GUEST

The decisions immediately preceding were adopted in the absence of a showing of legal fault in the conduct of the plaintiff,
and established the limitations of the obligation of the defendant
to take care for those who concededly were guilty of no omissions in caring for themselves. The conclusions of the courts hereafter discussed were adopted in circumstances showing a violation of duty owing by the host to the guest, where the defense was urged that the guest by his conduct, as evidencing
consent or acquiescence in the negligent conduct of the host, impliedly agreed to release the host from the consequences of his
otherwise actionable conduct.
Perhaps the best illustration of the twofold nature of the doctrine arises in the cases relating to mechanical defects in the
conveyance operated by the host when transporting the guest. So
far as the duty of the host to the guest is concerned, it is generally
said that he has a duty to apprise the guest of known defects,
but no duty to investigate to ascertain whether defects exist. As
to defects unknown to the host, it is sometimes said that the
guest "assumes the risk" of such defects. But it is also said
that the guest "assumes the risk" of deficiencies in the mechanical
condition of the automobile of which he has knowledge, -6"
although he does not "assume the risk" of latent defects2 70 If,
however, the defects are discoverable he may become a "coadven271

turer in the risk.1
269
Zimmer v. Little, (1940) 138 Pa. Super. 374, 10 A. (2d) 911 (question as to whether plaintiff had "voluntarily exposed himself" to the danger
from a defective door resolved for the plaintiff under Restatement definition

of assumption of risk) ; Smith v. Pacific Trunk Express, (1941) 164 Ore.
318, 100 P. (2d) 474, semble; Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W.
491, dicta;
Cleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, dicta.
270State, use of Beall v. McLeod, (Md. Surr. Ct.) U. S. Av. R. (1932)
94. Other cases thus restricting the defenses available to the guest, without
referring to the assumption of risk terminology, include Puckett v. Pailthorpe, (1929) 207 Ia. 613, 223 N. W. 254, and Stanbery v. Johnson, (1934)
218 Ia.
160, 254 N. W. 303.
2 71
1t was so held in Clise v. Prunty, (1930) 108 W. Va. 635, 153 S. E.
201, where an accident occurred because of the absence of chains which
guest should have known were not on the car: "Where possible danger is
reasonably manifest to an invited guest, and she sits by without warning
or protest to the driver and permits herself to be driven carelessly to her
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It was an obvious corollary of this application of the doctrine
that it should be extended to include at least the physical disabilities of the host. The analogy has been drawn272 and applied 272
in such cases in terms of assumption of risk.
It has been suggested (1) that the guest takes the host with
his known habits and eccentricities of driving, and (2) that even
where the guest enters the vehicle in ignorance of the lack of
skill of the driver, he will be considered to acquiesce in any course
of driving that has persisted long enough to give him an opportunity to protest and thus indicate dissent or disapproval of the
manner of driving.2 7 4 As to the first, the conclusion may be
generally stated to be that one "assumes the risk" of perils arising from the incompetency of the driver, known before the journey is undertaken. The Connecticut court 75 has refused to make
application of this aspect of the doctrine, and it has been disapproved in England. 76 Even where it has been adopted, as in
WVisconsin, it has been held that evidence showing that the guest
was familiar with the conduct of the host in operating an automobile on previous occasions would not justify a finding that he had
assumed the risk unless a further showing was made that the
guest had knowledge of some particular habit of the host which
resulted in the subsequent accident..2 77 However, the majority of
the states considering this phase of the doctrine have approved
it. 1'7 One important distinction arises between the application of
own injury, she becomes a coadventurer in the risk, and is thereby barred
of recovery . . . the evidence indicates her assent to the condition of the
car." See, also, In re O'Byrne's Estate, (1938) 133 Neb. 750, 277 N. W.
74, and Yates v. Brazelton, (1930) 108 Cal. App. 533, 291 Pac. 695, contra,
expressing the principle without reference to assumption of risk.
72Brogden, J., dissent in Norfleet v. Hall, (1933) 204 N. C. 573, 169
S. E. 7143; Cleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267.
- 3Doggett
v. Lacey, (1932) 121 Cal. App. 395, 9 P. (2d) 257.
,"4Young v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co., (1933) 212 Wis. 403, 249
N. W. 278, cited with approval in Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., (1937) 223
Wis. 662,
271 N. W. 374.
"27 Marks v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 Atl. 83.
"70Dann
v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 108 L. J. K. B. 255, 160 L. T.
433, per Asquith J.
277Forecki v. Kohlberg, (1941) 237 Wis. 67, 295 N. W. 7. Contra:
Kelley
v. Gagnon, (1931) 121 Neb. 113, 236 N. W. 160.
2
TWhite v. McVicker, (1933) 216 Ia. 90, 246 N. W. 385, dicta; Peay
v. Panich, (1935) 191 Ark. 538, 37 S. W. (2d) 23; Jacobs v. Jacobs, (1917)
141 La. 72, 74 So. 992; Kelley v. Gagnon, (1931) 121 Neb. 113, 236 N. W.
160; Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491, dicta; Maybee v.
Maybee, (1932) 79 Utah 585, 11 P. (2d) 973; and see cases cited at notes
274 and 277 supra. See also Olson v. Hermanson, (1928) 196 Wis. 614,
220 N. W. 203; Thomas v. Steppert, (1930) 200 Wis. 388, 228 N. W.
513; Fontaine v. Fontaine, (1931) 205 Wis. 570, 238 N. W. 410; and Ganzer
v. Great American Indemnity Co., (1932) 209 Wis. 135, 244 N. W. 588,
among other Wisconsin cases making application of the doctrine.
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the doctrine in cases where knowledge of the habits of the host
existed prior to the journey, and cases where the knowledge was
acquired during the journey. It has been held that where the guest
was familiar with the driving habits of the host before commencing" the journey, no amount of protest against his activities
during the journey is availing to prevent the operation of the
rule.2 79

Where the guest, after accepting the hospitality of the host,
discovers thereafter certain perilous driving habits endangering
the safety of both, it is said that the guest "assumes the risk" if
he acquiesces in the conduct of the driver.
Numerous problems arise in determining whether the guest
has in fact acquiesced in the conduct of the host. In a recent
21
Wisconsin decision, 280 inferentially supported by an earlier case,
it was held that the guest was under a duty to leave the vehicle
if his protests went unheeded, but it has been held otherwise in
Michigan,28 2 and a still earlier case in Wisconsin suggested that
after protests had been made as to the manner of operation of
the car, failure to leave the car was not contributory negligence.28 3 At least until the contrary is shown by the conduct of
the host, it seems that after protest the guest may assume that
the driver will not again engage in the conduct concerning which
the protest has been made.2- 84 The celerity with which a protest
279
Markovich v. Schlafke, (1939) 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516;
Bourestom v. Bourestom, (1939) 231 Wis. 666, 285 N. W. 426: (where
suit was brought by a wife against her husband) "She testified that her
husband was a fast driver and that she had cautioned him many times about
driving too fast. She voluntarily entered into the host-guest relationship and
accepted the benefits to be derived therefrom, knowing of that danger, and
she had, therefore, consented to assume the risk of her husband's known
habits. Her protests on the evening of the accident were unavailing to
relieve
her from her assumption of the risk of her husband's known habit."
28
28 Markovich v. Schlafke, (1939) 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516.
'Biersach v. Wechselberg, (1931) 206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 905.
282
Hemington v. Hemington, (1922) 221 Mich. 206, 190 N. W. 203.
28
3Krause v. Hall, (1928) 195 Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290.
284
Ragland v. Snotzmeier, (1933) 186 Ark. 778, 55 S. W. (2d) 932;
Pecor v. Home Indemnity Co. of New York, (1941) 234 Wis. 407, 291
N. W. 313; and see Wright v. Sellers, (1938) 25 Cal. App. (2d) 603, 78 P.
(2d) 209, holding that a very mild protest and rejoinder was sufficient to
bar the application of the doctrine, especially where the speed at
the time the protest was made was more dangerous at the point where the
accident happened because of perilous road conditions. Of course the doctrine
does not apply where protest is made and the guest is unable to leave the
automobile. Blanchard v. Ogletree, (1929) 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S. E. 116.
It ought be noted also that acquiescence in an occasional burst of excessive speed is not acquiescence in subsequent conduct of a motorist in
so driving through a deep drain. McKinley v. Dalton, (1932) 128 Cal. App.
298, 17 P. (2d) 160.
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must be made is to be determined by the jury. The courts, however, have established general limitations concerning the time
within which protest must be made. Where the conduct of the
2 -5
host is sudden and unexpected, obviously the rule cannot apply,
unless the emergency has arisen because of previous negligence
of the host in which the guest has acquiesced ;286 and where protest would clearly be unavailing, acquiescence in his negligence
2 7
will not be presumed.
C. APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT TO SPECIFIC FACTUAL
SITUATIONS
No well defined principle determining when the doctrine shall
be applied runs through the decisions. Because of the specific requirement of unspecific qualities-knowledge, appreciation, and
acquiescence-in the doctrine, courts have been tempted to declare more explicitly the circumstances upon which it must be
said that the guest has assumed the risk, leading to an illusory
kind of certainty in decisions in which multiple factors are never
the same. Thus, a factual classification of materials relating to
the subject is of limited value. Perhaps the chief value of such
a classification in this field is to illustrate the pitfalls awaiting
the jurist who seeks to create a definitive standard of conduct
for daily affairs which inherently include a plethora of variously

-'In reversing the findings below, the Massachusetts court held that the
doctrine could not be predicated on acquiescence where there was nothing
to show that the guest knew that the host would step on the gas pedal
while the guest attempted to apply the emergency brake. Holland v.
Pitochelli, (1938) 299 Mass. 554, 13 N. E. (2d) 390. The general rule
is well set out in Raddant v. Labutzke, (1940) 233 Wis. 381, 289 N. W.
659, that the guest does not assume the risk of the conduct of the motorist
at the immediate time of the occurrence, where there is neither time nor
occasion to object to or protest against conduct.
'-OValker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, (1934) 214 Wis.
519, 252 N. W. 721; Schwab v. Martin, (1938) 228 Wis. 45, 279 N. W.
699; 8Raddant v. Labutske, supra note 285.
- TEdward v. Kirk, (1940) 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875, (a comparatively few seconds); Kovar v. Beckius, (1937) 133 Neb. 487, 275 N. W.
670, (five seconds); Schwab v. Martin, (1938) 228 Wis. 45, 279 N. W. 699,
(one hundred feet) ; Webster v. Krembs, (1939) 230 Wis. 252, 282 N. W.
564 (three or four seconds) ; Rudolph v. Ketter, (1940) 233 Wis. 329, 289
N. W. 674, (twenty seconds); Helgestad v. North, (1940) 233 Wis. 349,
289 N. W. 822, (time indeterminate; excellent discussion of previously decided Wisconsin cases; host attempting to pass another car).
In other cases it has been held that, within the discretion of the jury,
it might be said that the protest should have been made at an earlier time:
Kauth v. Landsverk, (1937) 224 Wis. 554, 271 N. W. 841, (increase in
speed for five hundred feet); and that protest ought to have been made
as a matter of law: Miller v. Stephens, (1934) 63 S. D. 10, 256 N. W.
152, (guest rode for one hour without objecting to excessive speed).
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weighted factors incapable of accurate measurement in advance.
Subject to these limitations, it is proposed in the paragraphs following to consider the standard of conduct suggested by the
courts as constituting such knowledge, appreciation and acquiescence that a jury may or must say that assumption of risk was
present or absent. Consideration will be made of instances both
where the term is used to indicate a limitation of the "duty" of
the host where no claim of legal fault of the guest is presented,
and those cases in which it is said that the guest assumes the
risk of injury by reason of his "conduct" in acquiescing in negligent operation of the vehicle by the host.
1. Lookout. In cases involving the lookout of the host, an exception is found to the rule that the guest when accepting the
hospitality of the driver assumes the risk of his lack of skill
in operating the automobile,2 88 on the theory that keeping a proper
lookout requires no experience or acquired skill..2 89 If, however,
the guest knows and acquiesces in the faulty lookout of the host,
his "conduct" is such as to permit the application of the doctrine, 290
although here assumption of risk by conduct is difficult to establish, since lookout is a momentary matter.2 91 Whether the defective lookout of the host was a causative factor in resultant damage
is normally for the jury to decide, 2 2 unless the evidence is so
clear that the court as a matter of law declares the cause of the
accident to be defective observation.2 9 3 Failure of the guest to
keep a proper lookout for his own safety seems to have been considered as evidence of assumption of risk, but it has been suggested
that the guest owes no duty to the host to make suggestions with
294
reference to the management of the car.

2. Speed. Among other risks which the guest does not automatically assume, even though strictly speaking they may often
arise from the lack of skill and experience of the host, is the possibility that the driver will conduct the operation of the automo28
Weis v. Davis, (1938) 28 Cal. App. (2d) 240, 82 P. (2d) 487; Hall
v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491. See also Wisconsin cases
cited infra notes 289 to 293. And see Knutson v. Dilger, (1934) 62 S. D.
474, 2253 N. W. 459.
8OPoneitowcki v. Harres, (1929) 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W. 126. Approved in Neuser v. Thelen, (1932) 209 Wis. 262, 244 N. W. 801.
290Cummings v. Nelson, (1933) 213 Wis. 121, 250 N. W. 759; Elkey v.
Elkey,
(1940) 234 Wis. 149, 290 N. W. 627.
291
Maltby v. Thiel, (1937) 224 Wis. 648, 272 N. W. 848.
292
Madden v. Peart, (1930) 201 Wis. 259, 229 N. W. 57.
29
3Maltby v. Thiel, supra, note 291; Cummings v. Nelson, supra note
290. 294
Haines v. Duffy, (1931) 206 Wis. 193, 240 N. W. 152.
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bile at an excessive speed. 215 It is, however, obvious that the
guest may so conduct himself after learning of the predilection
of the driver to proceed at an excessive speed as to indicate his
acquiescence in it, and in such cases the guest is barred from recovery under the rule, 210 as well as in cases designating such
conduct of the guest as contributory negligence. It has been affirmed,'-'1,7 and denied, 218 that where the doctrine is invoked,
knowledge of the general conduct of the host in driving at an
excessive speed precludes a recovery of damages by the guest.
3. The "radius of vision" rule. The standard of conduct set
up in the contributory negligence cases, that the driver of an automobile must be able to stop within the radius of his vision ahead,
combines the two elements of speed and lookout, and in consideration of the doctrine of assumption of risk, principles governing
those factors are reiterated. Where the inability of the driver to
stop within the range of the assured clear distance ahead is not
known to the guest until five seconds or so before the accident,
the doctrine may not be invoked to bar recovery. 299 While courts
.51Here also the rationale of the cases is not convincing. In Poneitowcki
v. Harres, (1929) 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W. 126, it was suggested that it
required no experience or acquired skill to avoid driving at an excessive
speed, while the reason behind the rule was stated in Haines v. Duffy,
(1931) 206 Wis. 193, 240 N. W. 152, to be that 'Where the invitation is
to take an auto ride, the guest is warranted in assuming that the host will
not drive at a reckless or unlawful rate of speed." The rationale in the first
case is discussed, supra, note 262 and text. As to the second case, if the
guest is warranted in assuming (as a matter of realistic interpretation of
the automobile guest relationship) that the host will not drive at an unlawful or reckless rate of speed, it is hard to see why the more general rule
ought not be adopted that the guest may assume, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, that the host will conduct himself according to the
standard of the reasonably prudent man.
"-OValencia v. San Jose Scavenger Co., (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 469,
69 P. (2d) 480; Winston's Admx. v. City of Henderson, (1918) 179 Ky.
220, 200 S. W. 330; Hemington v. Hemington, (1922) 221 Mich. 206, 190
N. W. 203, (but guest need not leave the car if she protests) ; Nardone v.
Milton Fire Dist., (1941) 261 App. Div. 717, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 489; Miller
v. Stevens, (1934) 63 S. D. 10, 256 N. W. 152; Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63
S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491. The Wisconsin cases have also uniformly so
held. See Olson v. Hermanson, (1928) 196 Wis. 614, 220 N. W. 203;
Waters v. Markham, (1931) 204 Wis. 332, 235 N. W. 797; Hotz v. Ingels,
(1934) 214 Wis. 356, 253 N. W. 177; Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., (1937)
223 Wis. 662, 271 N. W. 374; Kauth v. Landsverk, (1937) 224 Wis. 554,
271 N. W. 841; Elkey v. Elkey, (1940) 234 Wis. 149, 290 N. W. 627;
Raddant v. Labutske, (1940) 233 Wis. 381, 289 N. W. 659. An early Wisconsin case discussed such conduct as contributory negligence as a matter
of law: Harding v. Jesse, (1926) 189 Wis. 652, 207 N. W. 706; but it was
later explained that only the doctrine of assumption of risk could properly
Haines v. Duffey, (1931) 206 Wis. 193, 240 N. W. 152.
be applied.
"(7 Bourestom v. Bourestom, (1939) 231 Wis. 666, 285 N. W. 426.
"98Marks v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 Atl. 83.
-25",Kovar v. Beckius, (1937) 133 Neb. 487, 275 N. W. 670.
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considering this factual situation have often applied the doctrine,
the difficulty of making application of the rule to concrete factual
situations is great, and the rationalization of the cases has not
been entirely convincing.300
4. Application of brakes. In the earlier cases on the question
of the liability of the host for improper application of brakes it
was clearly thought that this was a risk which was assumed by
the guest, even if he had no knowledge of the driving habits of the
host,301 though it is doubtful that the doctrine will be applied as
rigorously in the future as it has been in the past.30 2 Where knowledge of the driving habits of the host was possessed before the
journey began, it was held that the guest assumed the risk of this
type of misconduct of the host.13
5. Misjudgment of the course of another vehicle. While it would
seem logical that continued observation of the failure of the host
to judge properly the distance from and course of another vehicle
would constitute an assumption of the risk by the guest, no cases
on this matter have been determined by the courts, nor have they
generally discussed, as was done in Kelley v. Gagnon30 4 whether
a general knowledge of the driving characteristics of the host
would suffice to justify the application of the doctrine in such
cases. The doctrine was vigorously applied in 1934 to prevent a
recovery by the guest in the absence of any conduct on his part
indicating legal fault, in a case where the driver failed to calculate
3

0OThe rule was applied with especial harshness in Washington, where
it was held that a physician who was injured when his host ran off the highway was precluded by his acquiescence from recovering damages sustained
while hurrying to attend the mother of the host. Pinckard v. Pease, (1921)
115 Wash. 282, 197 Pac. 49. Compare Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis.
617, 246 N. W. 328, with Monsos v. Euler, (1934) 216 Wis. 133, 256 N. W.
630. And see Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis.
519, 252 N. W. 721, and Helgestad v. North, (1940) 233 Wis. 349, 289
N. W. 822, the latter of which discusses previous cases dealing at length
with the proof necessary to support the knowledge of danger and
acquiescence requirements of the doctrine in such cases.
3oIt was so held in the first clearly definitive case limiting the liability
of the host where the accident arose from his lack of skill. Cleary v.
Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, and the decision was later
approved in Ganzer v. Great American Indemnity Co., (1932) 209 Wis. 135,
244 N.
548.
302 WA.
The conduct of a host in running into a car entering an intersection
and turning to go in the same direction as the host was held actionable
negligence because of the deficiencies of the host in steering and applying
the brakes on the automobile, although the jury specifically found that
the host kept a proper lookout. Webster v. Krembs, (1939) 230 Wis. 252,
282 N. W. 564. It would seem that under the earlier cases such conduct
would
relate directly to the skill actually possessed by the host.
303
Kelley v. Gagnon, (1931) 121 Neb. 113, 236 N. W. 160.
3O4bid.
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properly the course of an automobile making a turn into the
highway ahead. 05 Yet in a case where the driver was blinded by
the lights of an approaching truck and turned off the concrete
slab of the roadway to his right, whereupon, in returning to the
pavement, the rear end of his car sideswiped the passing truck,
the court peremptorily held the driver liable to the passengers
even though the truck was over the center of the road.308 Here,
also, reconciliation of the cases is difficult, and it seems clear that
the Wisconsin court is progressing toward a relaxation of the
doctrine in so far as it limits the "duty" of the driver to the
passenger.
6. Intoxication of the driver. The cases in which the doctrine
has been applied where the guest accepts the hospitality of an intoxicated driver have already been noted.30 7 The question appears
to be normally one of fact to be decided by the jury, 30° unless
from the circumstances the condition of the driver must have
been manifest to the guest. 3 0 9 In an English case, the court refused

to apply the doctrine even where the guest knew when he elected
to become a passenger that "the driver was under the influence of
drink to such an extent as substantially to increase the chance of
a collision," specifically reserving the question of whether the doctrine might apply where the drunkenness of the driver was so
extreme that accepting his hospitality was "like engaging in an
10
intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation."'
7. Others. It has been held that where one knows of the lack
of sleep of a driver, he assumes the risk of such sleepiness ;311
that a mother knowing of the tendency of her daughter to turn
corners at a dangerous speed assumes the risk of such conduct
in a journey ;"' and that a guest who acquiesces in the action of
-':'Grover v. Sherman, (1934) 214 Wis. 152, 252 N. W. 680.
3oiSchwartz v. Schwartz, (1936) 222 Wis. 401, 267 N. W. 276. The
factual situation in Rudolph v. Ketter, (1940) 233 Wis. 329, 289 N. W. 674,
seems to make that case also essentially inconsistent with Grover v.
Sherman, supra note 305.
.',11ln the first section of this article, at notes 103-107, and text.
4'7,,Mahin's Adm'r v. McClellan, (1940) 279 Ky. 595, 131 S. W. (2d)
478.
311'Nardone v. Milton Fire Dist., (1941) 261 App. Div. 717, 27 N. Y. S.
(2d) 489.
Z1"Dann v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 108 L. J. K. B. 255, 160
L. T.31433.
lKrueger v. Krueger, (1929) 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784; Markovich v. Schlafke, (1939) 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516. Contra: Freedman
v. Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 AtI. 647; Gower v. Strain, (1933)
169 Miss. 344, 145 So. 244.
'l2Page v. Page, (1929) 199 Wis. 641, 227 N. W. 233.
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the host in parking on the wrong side of the road, with lights
assumes the risk of injuries arising from such conduct.3 13 At
same time, a guest does not assume the risk of the failure of
host to come to a complete stop at an arterial highway ;314 or

on,
the
the
the

conduct of the driver in backing a parked car into traffic.3 15

8. Conduct of the guest increasing the risk. Where the conduct of the guest increases the risk to himself, as when he is
riding in an overcrowded vehicle, 31 6 or in a dangerous and exposed position on an automobile, 17 it well may be said that he
"assumes the risk" of dangers arising from such conduct. But
all the jurisdictions dealing with the subject are unanimous in
their conclusion that the guest does not thereby assume the added
risk of the negligence of the host in operating the automobile. 318
It would seem that the duty of care on the host ought to increase
with his knowledge that the guest is in a position of danger. While
this question has not received extended consideration by the
courts, California has contrary decisions on the subject, holding
latterly that the host might operate the vehicle without regard
for the position of danger in which the guest has placed himself.31

D.

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO TIRD PARTIES

If, as has been suggested, the doctrine is based upon and justified by "relational interests" between the plaintiff and the defendant, it follows as a matter of course that where a guest has
assumed the risk of riding with a host known to be incompetent,
this defense is not available to a third party whose negligence
concurs with that of the host to cause injury to the guest. The
defense that the guest did not take precaution for his own safety,
and that he is himself guilty of contributory negligence in his
3 3
3 1-4 Scory v.

LaFave, (1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 643.
Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. v. Felten, (1939) 229 Wis. 29, 281
N. W. 637.
3-'Fischer v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., (1939) 230 Wis.
47, 283
N. W. 295.
316
Hawthorne v. Gunn, (1932) 123 Cal. App. 452, 11 P. (2d) 411;
Kalamian v. Kalamian, (1927) 107 Conn. 86, 139 Ati. 635.
317McGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508; Gornstein v.
Priver, (1923) 64 Cal. App. 249, 221 Pac. 396; Strong v. Olsen, (1925)
74 Cal. App. 518, 241 Pac. 107; Stout v. Lewis, (1929) 11 La. App. 503,
123 So. 346; Cosse v. Ballay, (La. App. 1933) 149 So. 285, and cases cited;
Wiese v. Polzer, (1933) 212 Wis. 337, 248 N. W. 113.
3lSIbid.
319 Compare Graff v. United Railroads of San Francisco, (1918) 178
Cal. 171, 172 Pac. 603, with Grassie v. American La France Engine Co.,
(1928) 95 Cal. App. 384, 272 Pac. 1073.
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conduct toward the third party defendant, may, of course, be
alleged and proved by the third party as in other cases. In states
which have applied the doctrine in a clearly definitive form, it
has accordingly been held that assumption of risk as to the host
is no defense to a third party,320 but in states which have failed
to draw a clear line between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, or have held that assumption of risk arises when contributory negligence is shown as a matter of law, it has been held
that assumption of risk as to the host provides a defense also to
the third party defendant.3 2'
E. CAUSATION

It seems well established that the assumption of one risk by
the guest does not bar his recovery under the doctrine' if his
damage is caused by a risk which was unassumed. Such a conclusion is in fact the leading principle of most of the cases relating to situations in which the guest has assumed a dangerous
position on the vehicle. 22 But where one of the items of negligence found by the jury to have been a cause of the accident,
and of which the plaintiff assumed the risk, cannot be isolated
or separated from another item also found by the jury to have
been a cause, it has been said that the assumption of risk of the
3
2JNational Motor Vehicle Co. v. Kellum, (1915) 184 Ind. 457, 109
N. E. 196; Edwards v. Kirk, (1940) 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875; Elliott
v. Coreil, (La. App. 1935) 158 So. 698, and cases cited. But cf. Sloan v.
Gulf Rfg. Co. of La., (La. App. 1932) 139 So. 26, in which it is not clear
whether the court holds the plaintiff assumed the risk as to the third party
or was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; Sommerfield v. Flury,
(1929) 198 Wis. 163, 223 N. W. 408; Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. W. 721; Scory v. LaFave, (1934) 215
Wis. 21, 254 N. V. 643; Bruins v. Brandon Canning Co., (1934) 216 Wis.
387, 257 N. W. 35; Kauth v. Landsverk, (1937) 224 Wis. 554, 271 N. W.
841; Canzeroni v. Heckert, (1936) 223 Wis. 25, 269 N. W. 716; Schubring
v. Weggen, (1940) 234 Wis. 517, 291 N. W. 788. Cf. Wiese v. Polzer,
(1933) 212 Wis. 337, 248 N. W. 113.
21Wiley v. Young, (1918) 178 Cal. 681, 174 Pac. 316; Valencia v. San
Jose Scavenger Co., (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 469, 69 P. (2d) 480; White
v. Cochrane, (1933) 189 Minn. 300, 249 N. W. 328; Winston v.Henderson,
(1918) 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W. 330, (although perhaps the court here is
talking about imputed negligence); Guile v. Greenberg, (1934) 192 Minn.
548, 257 N. W. 649, (rule apparently recognized as available to the third
party, but not applied); Robinson v. American Ice Co., (1928) 292 Pa.
St. 366, 141 Atl. 244; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Brown, (1918) 139 Tenn.

640, 202 S. W. 926; Rebillard v. Mil. St. P. & S. S. '. Ry. Co., (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1914) 216 Fed. 503.

32"-'Supra notes 316-319 and text. And see Krause v. Hall, (1928) 195
Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290. Cf. Buckingham v. Eagle Warehouse & Storage

Co., (1919) 189 App. Div. 760, 179 N. Y. S. 218.
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one causal factor will bar all recovery, 32 and it appears that
the effective force first in time and motivating the connected
whole of the damage will be held to constitute the proximate
cause of the accident.3 24 As a practical matter, this doctrine
may mean as much or as little as the court and jury desire in
limiting the liability of the defendant, for to the always elastic
requirement of proximate causation there is added the further
somewhat confusing qualification that if the jury could reasonably separate the two concurrent causes, the doctrine of assumption of risk might not be applied. So far as the writer has been
able to discover, this addition to the rule of proximate causation
has been applied in only two cases. 325 If relaxation of the rigor
of the doctrine is desired, a less involved procedure would seem
to be simply to hold as a matter of law that between two factors
contributing to the accident, the guest assuming the risk of one
and not the other, the jury must find on the evidence that one
factor was in fact the substantial cause of the damage and the
other was not.3 2 6 In California, it has been held that assumption
of risk of the excessive speed at which the host was driving did
not bar recovery of damages by the guest when the accident happened through a combination of excessive speed and defective
lookout. 3 27 and the rule adopted with reference to master and

servant cases imposed the doctrine only when the risk assumed
28
was the sole cause of 'plaintiff's injury.
323Young v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co., (1933) 212 Wis. 403,
249 N. W. 278; Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis.
519, 252 N. W. 721; Scory v. LaFave, (1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 643;
Monsos v. Euler, (1934) 216 Wis. 133, 256 N. W. 630. See also Campbell,
Work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court for the August, 1933, and January,
1934, 2Terms, (1934) 10 Wis. L. Rev. 69, 70.
32 4Elkey v. Elkey, (1940) 234 Wis. 149, 290 N. W. 627.
3 Young v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co., (1933) 212 Wis. 403, 249
N. W. 278; Scory v. LaFave, (1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 643. It is
quite possible that there may be others; the subject is completely without
index, and the principles here involved are rather implicit than explicit
inthe cases.
326This is the usual way of handling the problem, and has been utilized
even in cases acknowledging the general rule as to causation. See Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. W. 721; Monsos
v. Euler, (1934) 216 Wis. 133, 256 N. W. 630; Elkey v. Elkey, (1940) 234
Wis. 149, 290 N. XAr. 627. See also, for general examples of the usual
procedure, Thomas v. Steppert, (1930) 200 Wis. 388, 228 N. W. 513, and
Koscuik
27 v. Sherf, (1937) 224 Wis. 217, 272 N. W. 8.
Weis v. Davis, (1938) 28 Cal. App. (2d) 240, 82 P. (2d) 487.
Semble:
8 Knutson v. Dilger, (1934) 62 S. D. 474, 253 N. W. 459.
32 Shearman and Redfield, The Law of Negligence, (1913) 293. 294:
"If two or more causes contribute to produce the injury, the plaintiff's assumption of risk as to one will not preclude his recovery for injury produced
by any other cause. .. "
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VII.
A.

EFFECT OF OTHER RULES OF CONDUCT UPON THE DOCTRINE

"GUEST STATUTES" AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

It has been noted that some courts drawing an analogy between
the bailor-bailee relationship and that of the automobile guest,
require that the guest show gross negligence of the host in establishing a cause of action. This requirement of a showing of gross
negligence has been imposed in other jurisdictions by so-called
"guest statutes" which may also bespeak the bases of the liability
of the host in terms of reckless, wilful, or wanton misconduct, or
their equivalent.
Where the term "assumption of risk" is conceived as a limitation on the duty of the host, regardless of the conduct of the
guest, limitation of liability by "guest statutes" is relatively unimportant. The standard of care thereunder is obviously less for
the host than when "assumption of risk" is invoked, for under
the statutes, a host failing to exercise the skill which he possesses
is nevertheless not responsible to the guest in damages unless he
has operated the vehicle recklessly, wilfully, or wantonly. The
doctrine, however, becomes important when considered as a matter involving the conduct of the guest.
It is impossible here to deal with the various standards of
care required under the "guest statutes," and their relationship
to contributory negligence, except to say that in almost all cases
it is recognized that contributory negligence is no defense to wanton and wilful misconduct because the nature of the action in
each case is dissimilar, an implied intent to injure being present 3in
2 9
reckless, wanton, or wilful operation of the vehicle by the host.

Not infrequently it has been said that contributory negligence is no
defense to an action in which it is shown that gross negligence
existed. 330 The social problems presented by the passage of the
guest statutes were not simple. As legislatures of about half the
states passed such laws,331 interpretation of the rights of the parties grew increasingly complex. Under existing law, the remarkable result was reached that a guest permitting his host to engage
in ordinarily negligent conduct was precluded from recovery from
the host if the court found that in failing to protest or ask to leave
329
See cases cited in annotation, What Amounts to Gross or Wanton
Negligence in Driving an Automobile Precluding the Defense of Contributory Negligence, 38 A. L. R. 1424, and annotations supplementary thereto;
Prosser, Torts, (1941) 402.
33OIbid.
3
XWeber, Guest Statutes, (1937) 11 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 24.
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the car he did not act as a reasonably prudent man would do. On
the other hand, the guest who accompanied the host on a journey
where the misconduct of the host exceeded that of mere negligence,
without protest on the part of the guest, could recover on the
ground that his contributory negligence was no defense to the
"intentional" tort of the host.
Some courts adopted techniques to establish a more realistic
distribution of loss between the parties in such cases, among them
the technique that where the host engaged in reckless, wilful, or
wanton misconduct, the guest was subject to the doctrine of assumption of risk if he knew of the danger, appreciated the risk,
and voluntarily submitted himself to it. If the proof of the elements of knowledge, appreciation and acquiescence in potential
danger are the same under either doctrine, courts might prevent
a recovery by the guest exposing himself to the more perilous
potentialities in accompanying a wilful or wanton driver, by applying the rule of contributory negligence under the name of assumption of risk. In referring to the adoption of the doctrine of assumption of risk in Iowa, the court quite frankly said:
"In states which have so-called 'Guest Statutes,' such as ours
... the courts are of necessity driven to the adoption of some
such rule as that announced in the McVicker Case in order to find
any basis upon which the guest might be barred from recovery.
The cause of action, under our guest statute, is not based on
negligence, but upon recklessness, and, since we have held that
'recklessness is more than negligence,' it follows that contributory
negligence, is not an element to be considered or dealt with.
either by pleading, proof, or instruction of the court, in cases
brought under this statute."33
The doctrine has been applied in both Iowa and Wisconsin to
prevent recovery.33 3 The Michigan court refused to recognize
the concept, 33 4 and other jurisdictions, while apparently recognizing the applicability of the doctrine, have refused to apply it
to specific circumstances presented. 335
Consideration of the guest statutes raises an interesting question concerning the applicability of the doctrine where the guest
332Edwards v. Kirk, (1940) 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875.
333White v. McVicker, (1933) 216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385; Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. W. 721; and
Patterly, J., in Schubring v. Weggen, (1940) 234 Wis. 517, 291 N. W. 788.
334Schneider v. Draper, (1936) 276 Mich. 259, 267 N. W. 831.
335 Freedman v. Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647; Wright v.
Sellers, (1938) 25 Cal. App. (2d) 603, 78 P. (2d) 209; Kovar v. Beckius,
(1937) 133 Neb. 487, 275 N. W. 670; Carpenter v. Thomas, (1931) 164
Wash. 583, 3 P. (2d) 1001.
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is a paying rather than a non-paying passenger, for normally the
statutes are limited in their operation to cases where no consideration is received for the transportation. Where the doctrine is
applied to limit the liability of the host in the first instance, regardless of the conduct of the plaintiff, the fact that consideration
passed between the passenger and the driver may be important,
and in some decisions using the term in this sense emphasis is
put on the fact that the guest was gratuitous. 336 Where the doctrine arises from the conduct of the guest in voluntarily submitting to a known peril, the courts have made no distinction between
cases where the passengers paid compensation and those where
there was none.

33 7

B.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

The doctrines of assumption of risk and last clear chance are
antithetical in so far as the interpretation of the theory of assumption of risk is based on the conclusion that the defendant is relieved of a duty by the conduct of the plaintiff, for the rule of
last clear chance in effect establishes a new duty on the defendant
after he has seen and realized the peril of the plaintiff. The doctrines are similar in the difficulty encountered in each of establishing actual knowledge of peril on the part of the party against
whom the rule is sought to be applied. It is significant that in
treatment of the doctrine of last clear chance by the editors of
the Restatement the rule was declared to be, consonant with that
adopted in the doctrine of assumption of risk, that actual knowledge and realization of peril need not be shown 3 ' Courts loosely
using the term "assumption of risk," or its equivalent, in cases
not involving relational interests have held that the doctrine of
last clear chance applied even where the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of injury,33 and that there could be no assumption of risk
33
: 'Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491, (assumption of
risk of known proficiency of driver) ; Marple v. Haddad, (1927) 103 W. Va.
508, 138 S. E. 113, (duty of host to examine automobile for defects);
Cleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, (skill in driving
possessed by driver). It was held that the relationship was gratuitous, however, under the doctrine of assumption of risk, where the parties agreed to
share the cost of the gasoline in defraying transportation costs to a footBrockhaus v. Neuman, (1930) 201 Wis. 57, 228 N. W. 477.
ball game.
137Cases particularly illustrative of the attitude of the courts on this
problem are cited supra, in the first section of this article at notes 168 to 174
and text, where the doctrine was applied to passengers upon street railways.
See also, as to automobiles, Weis v. Davis, (1938) 28 Cal. App. (2d) 240,
82 P. (2d) 487.
33',3 Restatement of Torts, (1934) Sec. 479, 480.
,-Bradley v. Wood, (1922) 207 Ala. 602, 93 So. 534; Lee v. Baltimore
& 0. R. Co., (1914) 246 Pa. St. 566, 92 Att. 719.
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where the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid injury
30
while the plaintiff was effecting the rescue of his property. 4
The doctrine has not been considered in relation to the automobile
guest, but a consideration of the two doctrines is implicit in a
concurring opinion by Justice Harvey in a case decided by the
Kansas court, where the host urged that the guest was guilty of
legal fault in sleeping during a journey in which the host also
went to sleep, thus causing a collision. Judge Harvey said:
"But if defendant invited plaintiff to go to sleep in his car, or,
knowing that plaintiff had gone to sleep, acquiesced in his sleeping while a guest, he is not in very good position to complain of
the fact that plaintiff was asleep, for he would then know plaintiff's senses of observation were dormant and not functioning. Due
care on defendant's part would require him to take that matter
into consideration, perhaps as much so as if defendant had invited a blind deaf mute to ride with him, or an infant, or one
decrepit with age or incapacitated by disease. Naturally in any
of those situations the ability of the guest to care for himself
should be taken into consideration in determining whether or
not the host used due care."3 41 (Italics supplied.)

In essence, this question is posed: If it may be said that the
guest by acquiescing in negligent conduct of the host, with actual
or constructive knowledge of potential peril, assumes the risk
of that misconduct, might it not also be said that the host, knowing of the want of due care on the part of the guest (either in
sleeping or not protesting against the misconduct of the driver)
acquiesced in such conduct of the guest and hence cannot avail
himself of it? Ought not the host to accept the known or unknown
riding characteristics of the guest as much as the guest assumes
the driving characteristics of the host? And if the guest is unfamiliar with motor vehicles or has a predilection for riding fast,
ought not the host to accept the guest as he is? Are not the social necessities, which require one having the person of another
at his mercy to protect him properly, sufficient to impose this
duty on the host? The answer is, of course, that in a realistic
way each takes the other as he finds him, and ought to exercise
the care of a reasonably prudent man in like circumstances, and
none other. Judge Harvey's position, that one ought not to try
to take advantage of conduct of another which he has countenanced
and which puts that other in a position of greater danger, and
that such conduct should be considered in determining whether
34'Gover v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., (1922) 96 Vt. 208, 118 Atl. 874.
34
1Howse v. Weinrich, (1931) 133 Kan. 132, 298 Pac. 766.
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the actor has exercised care, is eminently appropriate, and the
determination of the question is quite properly left where he inferentially places it-with the jury. But whether such conduct be
denominated in terms of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, or a violation of the last clear chance rule, it seems apparent
that in all cases the effect of failure to discharge the duty ought
to be the same-a result not now obtained by reason of judicial
reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk, which restricts the
rights of the guest more rigidly than that of contributory negligence.
C. SUIT BY GUEST AGAINST A THIRD PARTY

Where the risk of the conduct of the driver which contributes
to the damage has been assumed by the guest, it obviously makes
no difference in the liability of the host that the accident occurred
because of the concurrence of the risk assumed with the negligence of a third party. In either case the defense of assumption
of risk is available to the host. It equally seems clear, as heretofore
suggested, that assumption of risk as to the conduct of the host
does not extend to the third party. But if the guest is contributorily negligent with respect to the third party (in failing to protest against excessive speed, improper lookout or other conduct
of the host), his recovery against the third party may be denied
altogether if he has failed to exercise the care of a reasonably
prudent man. Normally, of course, this is designated as contributory negligence and not as assumption of risk. But the question
arises: Is not the conduct of the guest in assuming the risk as
to the host such as to constitute contributory negligence to the
third party as a matter of law? The answer seems clear where
the doctrine of assumption of risk is used to denote a limitation
of the duty of the host, without respect to the conduct of the
guest. To make application of the doctrine in establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law to the third party where
the limitation is established as to the "duty" of the host, without
reference to legally unjustifiable "conduct" on the part of the
guest would be manifestly inequitable, for no legal fault exists
as to the guest.
Where the behavior of the guest prohibits recovery from the
host because of acquiescence in a known and appreciated danger,
however, it would seem equitable to hold that such "conduct"
ought to be a bar to a recovery against a third party as contribu-
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tory negligence. If, as has been suggested, the content of the
terms "acquiescence," "knowledge," and "appreciation" is established in fact by reference to the conduct of the reasonably prudent man, such a conclusion seems inevitable.34 2 Yet it was held
by the Wisconsin court in Scory v. LaFave that assumption of
risk as to the host is not, as a matter of law, contributory negligence to a third party, and that if the hazards assumed "were
no greater than ordinarily careful and prudent persons usually
assume under similar circumstances, then plaintiff's conduct was
merely within the field of assumption of risk and did not constitute contributory negligence."'34 3 But this conclusion ought not
to be accepted without reservations. It is difficult to conceive how
one with actual or constructive knowledge of peril, exposing himself to it for no socially justifiable purpose, can be considered to
be acting as a reasonably prudent man would have acted, unless
the peril is so remote as to be inconsequential. 34 4 And if the peril
is (as suggested by the court) not imminent or grave in its nature,
how may it be said that the guest shall be charged with actual or
even constructive knowledge and appreciation of its existence?
Moreover, it must be said not only that there is constructive
knowledge and appreciation of the peril, but also, at the root of
the doctrine, that the plaintiff consented to be harmed by it-a
requirement far from realistic in the automobile guest cases where
the possibility of peril is remote, and one not required even in the
Wisconsin cases.3 45 The dissent of Judge Fowler, reaching to the
3
42Note,
however, that such a conclusion conflicts with the theory that
the relational interests between host and guest prompt the application of the
doctrine; in such case the standard of care of the guest would be the same
toward those with whom relational interests obtained and those with whom
no relational interests.
he had
3 3
4 Scory v. LaFave, (1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 653. Contra:
Sloan3 4v. Gulf Rfg. Co. of Louisiana, (La. App. 1932), 139 So. 26.
4 See Comment by Clark M. Byse, (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev. 376, 380,
which suggests that the court in reality bases the application of the doctrine on whether the host as a reasonably prudent man would be justified
in believing that the guest was aware of and assented to the risk, and not
an actual acquiescence in a known and appreciated danger. Except for the
very doubtful case of Scory v. LaFave, which is apparently still followed.
there is nothing in the Wisconsin cases to indicate the exact basis upon
which the doctrine is applied. But in application the doctrine seems to
the writer to be indistinguishable from that of contributory negligence.
and the requirements for application of the doctrine in practice to be substantially the same in each case. See also, discussion of the case of Scory v.
LaFave in Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions.
137, 138.
(1936)
34
5E.g., it is quite within the realm of possibility that damage may
occur to the guest in the area of sudden speed in passing cars, lookout.
or disobedience to the law of the road, but damage so remote was said
by the Wisconsin court not to come within the doctrine. Poneitowcki v.
Harres, (1929) 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W. 126.
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entire foundation of the doctrine in its application to automobile accident cases, seems the better view. Other states have
not considered the question.
In states where, as in Wisconsin, a comparative negligence
statute has been adopted, the application of the doctrine of assumption of risk raises problems still more complex. As to the
host, it is clear from the case of Scory v. LaFave, and others
preceding it, that assumption of risk is a complete bar to recovery
from the host, and not a partial bar, as where the doctrine of
contributory negligence is applicable. In all cases, the contributory
negligence of the guest is to be measured against that of the third
party. Yet he has "assumed the risk" of the negligence of the
host. If the jury concludes that the guest is ten per cent negligent, the host ten per cent negligent, and the third party eighty
per cent negligent, must the third party pay eighty per cent of
the damage or ninety per cent of the damage? In short, who is
chargeable with the ten per cent negligence of the host? Or supposing that under the rule in Scory v. LaFave, the guest assumed
the risk as to the host, but was not at all contributorily negligent
as to the third party, and the host and the third party are each
fifty per cent negligent in causing the accident. Would the guest
be able to recover all of his loss from the third party, or only
fifty per cent of such damages? Under the Wisconsin comparative
negligence statute, it has been held that the guest can recover for
all damages except the percentage found by the jury to constitute
his share of the burden by reason of his contributory negligence,
and that this does not include his bearing the burden of the negligence of the host, even though he "assumed the risk" of such
negligence. 341 Logically, the effect of the comparative negligence
statute seems justified under the wording of the Wisconsin statute. However, legislative amendment of the rule announced has
been urged.

4

1

D.

CONTRIBUTION

Still more complexity attends the operation of the doctrine
where the state in which the doctrine is applied permits suit
4

tOWalker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking, Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519,
252 N. W. 721, approved in Canzeroni v. Heckert, (1936) 223 Wis. 25,
269 N.
W. 716.
347Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
(1936) 138. Professor Gregory urges that the guest be allowed in all
cases to recover against the third party on the ground that his assumption of risk was contributory negligence only, such contributory negligence
to be balanced with the negligence of the third party.
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by one of two or more joint tort feasors to apportion damages
between them. Suppose the guest sues the third party for damages; that under the contribution statute the third party interpleads the host; and that it is found that the guest assumed the
risk of accident as to the host, but that the negligence of the host
and that of the third party each contributed to the accident. The
third party thereupon must pay the damages to the guest. Thereafter he sues the host for contribution for the damages. Difficulties arise for the court in whatever decision might be made. To
require the host to contribute to the damages would be in effect
to nullify the doctrine of assumption of risk in cases where the
negligence of another concurred with that of the host in causing
damage to the guest. To hold that the guest ought to bear the
burden of the negligence of the host (since he had "assumed the
risk" of the negligence as to him) would be in effect to say
that he "assumed the risk" as to the third party as well as the
host. To hold that the third party must pay all the damage to the
guest, without recourse to the host, would be to impose a burden
on him that the rule was clearly designed to alleviate. The Wisconsin court adopted the third of these alternatives, holding that
where the accident resulted from a risk assumed by the guest the
third party must bear the burden of the loss alone, 4s but that the
burden of showing that the guest assumed the risk as to him
rested on the host.349

A further refinement of the rule was

necessitated by the earlier conclusion of the court that contribution
might be had between the host and the third party only where
each had been subjected to a common liability. A finely drawn
distinction was adopted under this rule in determining whether
the respective duties of the host and third party toward the guest
were the same. Cases had repeatedly held that the duty of the
host to the passenger was not to increase the danger to him; but
the duty of the host to the third party was to use ordinary care
for the safety of other persons on the highway. Hence the court
adopted the theory that where the failure of the host to protect his
guest arose from conduct concerning which the duty owed was
348
Roeber v. Pandl, (1930) 200 Wis. 420, 228 N. W. 512; Standard
Accident Ins. Co. v. Runquist, (1932) 209 Wis. 97, 244 N. W. 757; Neuser
v. Thelen, (1932) 209 Wis. 262, 244 N. W. 801; Walker v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. W. 721; Milwaukee
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Felten, (1939) 229 Wis. 29, 281 N. W. 637;
Webster v. Krembs, (1939) 230 Wis. 252, 282 N. W. 564; Forecki v.
Kohlberg,
(1941) 237 Wis. 67, 295 N. W. 7.
349
Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Runquist, (1932) 209 Wis. 97, 244
N. W. 757.
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the same toward the guest as to others on the highway (such as
failure to keep a proper lookout or drive at a proper speed)
contribution would lie.35 0
E.

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE

It has been suggested that normally the assumption of risk
of the guest is no defense to the third party in an action brought
against him by the guest. However, the same circumstances which
justify an application of the doctrine of assumption of risk as
between host and guest may justify imputing the negligence of
the driver to the passenger, thus precluding a suit by the guest
against a third party where the negligence of the host is such
as to bar the host from suit against such third party." 1 In some
of the cases, it is difficult to determine from the language of the
decision whether it is held that the guest has "assumed the risk"
as to the third party, or whether the negligence of the host is
imputed to the guest under the theory that negligence may be
imputed from a driver to a passenger who unreservedly places
himself in the hands of his host. Whatever theory may be implicit in the decisions, it is certain that courts have on occasion
denied recovery to the guest under such circumstances.3 52 If the
essence of the doctrine in each case is the acquiescence in the negligent conduct of another, the possibility is present that the doctrine
of assumption of risk may be extended under the name of imputed
negligence to include third parties.
F.

VIOLATION OF STATUTE

Violation of a statute relating to the operation of a motor
vehicle on the highway is generally considered to be evidence of
negligence. 3 3 Does the guest accompanying the driver guilty of
3SoNeuser v. Thelen, (1932) 209 Wis. 262, 244 N. W. 801.
-lKnipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Vis. 617, 246 N. W. 328. Here it
was held that a wife had not only assumed the risk of injury by her husbandhost, but also that his negligence was imputed to her because she had
completely entrusted her safety to her husband. Under the Wisconsin rule,
however, the doctrine of imputed negligence was limited to cases involving
such relations as principal and agent, master and servant, or some family
relationship.
352
Valencia v. San Jose Scavenger Co., (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d)
469, 69 P. (2d) 480; Chapman v. Powers, (1928) 150 Miss. 687, 116 So.
609; Winston v. Henderson, (1918) 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W. 330; LeDoux
v. Alert Transfer & Storage Co., (1927) 145 Wash. 115, 259 Pac. 24;
Ingerick v. Mess, (C.C.A. 2d. Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 233. But see Wiley v.
Young,
(1918) 178 Cal. 681, 174 Pac. 316.
35
-sThe rule seems well settled. See 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (1926) 1157.
3
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such conduct assume the risk of injury thereby? It is clear that
in Wisconsin the guest, while taking the driver as he is found,
subject to the host's limitations of skill in the operation of his
automobile, does not assume the risk of his violation of the law
of the road simply by accompanying him on the journey. 54 However, where the violation of a law of the road occurs over an
extended period of time with acquiescence of the guest, the
doctrine of assumption of risk through the conduct of the guest
has been applied. 55
VIII.
A.

CRITIQUE OF THE DOCTRINE

LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE DOCTRINE

A primary difficulty with the logic of the doctrine is encountered in attempting to rationalize the widespread use of the
terminology in unconnected cases relating to the "duty" of the
defendant. It is used interchangeably to convey a specialized concept and no doctrine at all. "Assumption of risk" in common
usage means simply that there are certain risks to which an
individual is subject, for which he has no cause of action against
the individual who set the injuring force in motion. So used, the
doctrine of assumption of risk is essentially nothing more nor less
than the doctrine that no man shall recover from another unless
that other violates a legal duty towards him-which is, in turn,
only a broad general statement of a universal principle underlying all law.
In the earlier cases, the influence of the maxim, "volenti non fit
injuria," somewhat limited the breadth of the general use of the
term "assumption of risk" from that described above. Where consent, whether actual (as in the seduction cases), or constructive
through contract (as in the master-servant cases) or by conduct
(as in the licensor-licensee cases where the parties knew of the
existence of a hazard) was given by the plaintiff that the defendant
should not be held liable, no recovery might be had. This aspect
of the doctrine is hardly more susceptible to classification than
the other. In the first place, confusion has been and still is the
inevitable result of the dual meanings of the term. Second, the
354Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328.
355Ibid. See also White v. Cochrane, (1933) 189 Minn. 300, 249 N. W.
328, in which it was assumed without discussion that one riding in a car
without headlights might be guilty of negligence or assumption of risk
as to a third party as well as the host. The statement is dictum. See also
Rebillard v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1914)
216 Fed. 503, to the same effect.
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social disciplines sought to be effected by the courts in implying
a consent to injury have been so divergent that the courts have
been hard put to promulgate a rational basis for distinction between
the cases in which the term ought or ought not to be applied to
limit the liability of the defendant. Is not the "consent" the same
when Lord Mellish's street. sweeper continues -sweeping with
knowledge of the reckless nature of the passing cabman, as that
of a pedestrian passing over a way made dangerous by neglect
of public officials, or a workman in the mine knowing that trains
pass behind his position daily in a dangerous condition? Yet
the application of the doctrine, conditioned by contemporary ethical
and social considerations, has varied in each case. In due course,
it was concluded that the doctrine (that consent to injury ought
be inferred) ought to apply only in cases where the plaintiff
knew, appreciated, and voluntarily encountered the danger. Even
this broke down in the automobile guest cases, in which courts
substituted the term "acquiescence" for the volens of the older rule.
Efforts by commentators and some courts to limit the application of the doctrine to cases involving a relational interest between
the parties have not been universally successful, for the doctrine
continues to be applied occasionally in cases between litigants not
standing in such relationship.
While all this development of the doctrine of assumption of
risk was taking place the courts were also applying the doctrine
of contributory negligence with increasing frequency to cases
where knowledge, appreciation and voluntary assumption of, or
acquiescence in, peril were evident. Attempts made to distinguish
the two doctrines failed, principally because the interpretation
of the terms "knowledge," "appreciation," and "volens," being
words of indefinite content, was in each case fundamentally measurable only by the same standard of conduct: whether the actor
had performed with reason and prudence as other men would or
ought to have done. Mloreover, it was impossible for the courts
to expound a rational distinction between assumption of risk and
the less penalistic doctrine of contributory negligence in such
fashion as to make controlling the obvious social, ethical, and
economic factors which have in fact been determinative of the
result.

B.

DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE

Not only do the two doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence seem inseparable in theory, but they are in
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fact interchangeably used. Part of this is due to the fact that the
phrase "assumes the risk" fits so aptly into discussions of the
subject of contributory negligence; without apparently intending to refer to a specialized doctrine the courts have said that
when one assumes a risk of injury under certain circumstances he
is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. To attempt
to determine what constitutes contributory negligence as a matter
of law, even for the automobile guest, is to find one's self plunged
in a welter of conflicting precedents in which varying equities of
the parties often lead the judiciary into making distinctions without difference. 56 Since the doctrine of assumption of risk has been
applied most generally in Wisconsin, the treatment of the cases
under the doctrine in that state, under an unusually competent
court, ought to be fairly representative of difficulties arising in the
application of the doctrine. Difficulties of the Wisconsin court in
the application of the rule have already been noted, both with respect to the concept of the doctrine as a matter of the duty of the
defendant, and as limiting recovery because of the conduct of the
plaintiff, 35 7 and the decisions reveal that application of the doctrine
of assumption of -isk in these cases is no less hazardous to the
symmetry of the law than that of contributory negligence.
3
5GIt is notorious that the verdicts of juries often require revision by
appellate tribunals, and where the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is the principal matter at issue, it is inevitable that in making such corrections the courts should set up a standard of conduct from which analogies
may be-drawn in other cases. In seeking to secure an equitable result in the
weighing of factors which are sometimes intangible, it is also inevitable
that courts should modify and distinguish precedents upon apparently insubstantial grounds. Occasionally, also, technological changes make modification of existing standards of conduct imperative, as in the so-called "radius
of vision" and "stop, look, and listen" rules. The criticisms hereafter made
of the decisions in the field of assumption of risk, therefore, may be made
of most
courts also in the field of contributory negligence.
35
7See notes 295, 300-302, 305, 306 supra, and text. As to when one
assumes the risk of improper lookout of another as a matter of law, compare Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328, with Duss v.
Friess, (1937) 225 Wis. 406, 275 N. W. 547; with reference to assumption
of risk and contributory negligence as a matter of law relating to third
parties compare Wiese v. Polzer, (1933) 212 Wis. 337, 248 N. W.
113, with Scory v. LaFave, (1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 643. The
court has also experienced difficulty in applying the rule that the guest
"assumes the risk" of the lack of skill of the host: Cf., e.g., Eisenhut v.
Eisenhut, (1933) 212 Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440, with Fischer v. London
Guarantee & Accident Co., (1939) 230 Wis. 47, 283 N. W. 295. The difficulties encountered in establishing conduct as legal fault as a matter of
law in these cases is emphasized in the factual distinctions sought to be
made in Helgestad v. North, (1940) 233 Wis. 349, 289 N. W. 822. In
order to mitigate the harshness of the rule, the courts have sometimes
appeared to be making an obvious effort to avoid application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co., (1932) 209 Wis. 489, 245
N. W. 159.
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C.

SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE DESIRABILITY OF THE
DOCTRINE

1. As related to the "duty" of the defendant. Since repeated
use of the term with reference to the "duty" of the defendant in
the different fields represents a conclusion of the court on a
substantially different classification of factual situations, it seems
impossible to weigh social considerations in this use of the term.
To attempt to analyze adequately the social justification of the
doctrine in each case would require examination of the social
backgrounds for the entire law of the subject in which the term
is used. In so far as the term has come to be used, particularly
in Wisconsin, as descriptive of the limitation of the liability of
the automobile host for accidents arising because he fails conscientiously to exercise the skill which he possesses, the social inequalities of the rule appear manifest. While the rule has a note
of equity in the conclusion that the host ought not to be required to
exercise greater care for the guest than he can exercise for himself,
application of the rule in practice has resulted in confusion and
appears in fact to have been relaxed by the Wisconsin court in
late years. From an equitable standpoint, the rule that a man must
exercise the degree of skill which he represents himself to have,
suggested in Judge Campbell's concurrence in Hall v. Hall,58
appears more sound, although it seems to the writer that any rule
of law which depends in application on the distinction between
whether an actor was conscientiously using the skill he possessed,
or was possessed of a lesser degree of skill than the average man,
is calculated to introduce an excess of confusion into an already
ill-defined field.
Essentially, however, where the term has been used to designate a limitation of the duty of the defendant, it seems descriptive
rather than doctrinal, and as Lewis Carroll wrote many years
ago:
" 'If there's no meaning in it,' said the King, 'that saves a
world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any.'"
2. As to the "conduct of the plaintiff. If it be conceded that
the knowledge, appreciation, and acquiescence of the plaintiff in
a known risk must be measured by ascertaining whether the
plaintiff had the quantum of knowledge and appreciation of peril
that a reasonably prudent man ought to have had, there seems no
question that the doctrine would be at least as socially justifiable
36-(1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491.
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as those standards of conduct judicially approved within the field
of contributory negligence, except for the variation in the effect
of each doctrine upon the litigant.
It is no secret that in practice the primary aim of the plaintiff
in a personal injury case is to get his case before a jury, while
the defendant attempts to secure a determination of the cause, if
possible, from the court. In view of the very general prejudice of
juries against defendants in such cases, it seems important in any
social approach to the problem of equitable distribution of the
burden of bearing loss, to ascertain whether one doctrine is more
likely to be considered as a matter for decision by the court than
the other. There seems little question that the determination of
loss distribution problems in such cases is more likely to be considered as a matter for the court where the doctrine of assumption
of risk is adopted. This has been the experience in cases involving
master and servant, and generally speaking it seems also to be
true in the treatment of the doctrine by the Wisconsin court.
This is particularly true in view of the general conclusion of the
courts that the doctrine of assumption of risk involves the "duty"
of the defendant, even though that "duty" may shift because of
conduct of the plaintiff involving legal fault, for a determination
of a question of "duty" has been traditionally within the jurisdiction of the court, rather than the jury. Courts are normally
reluctant to reverse the verdict of a jury below where no pattern
exists against which the findings of the jury may be measured;
but where it is possible to seek for evidences of conduct which
according to a recognized and traditional pattern bars recovery,
the rationale of a court setting aside a verdict below is rendered
considerably more convincing, even though at bottom the question
in each case is the same.
In short, where the court examines a record and finds knowledge, appreciation, and acquiescence in or voluntary assumption
of a perilous condition, it then seems more clear that they are
applying and not creating a standard of conduct for the servant
or guest, notwithstanding that in fact the quantum of plaintiff's
knowledge, appreciation, and acquiescence in the risk is measured
by the standard of what the reasonably prudent man would or
ought to have done. Concomitant with such review, whether in the
field of assumption of risk or contributory negligence, arise standards of care in which courts will say what the conduct of the
reasonably prudent man ought to have been, rather than what it is.
In most cases involving personal injuries, in which the defense
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of assumption of risk may be raised, the courts perforce delicately
endeavor to balance a distribution of the burden of loss upon those
who best can bear it, against the modern conception of the old
volenti maxim: that one who invites or consents to an injury
cannot recover damages where loss results from the risk to
which consent was given. Because juries are most inclined to
err, distributing the burden of loss without regard to the relative
fault of the parties, revision of verdicts in the appellate court has
not been unusual, and the doctrine of assumption of risk has
seemed to some courts an attractive technique in regulating the
conduct of juries by setting up a more explicit standard of care
to which a plaintiff must conform to justify his recovery of
damages. While close (perhaps even closer) analysis of jury
verdicts by the appellate court in such cases seems imperative,
it is submitted that the end ought not to be sought through reliance
on the rationale of assumption of risk. There is no requirement
of conduct under the doctrine which may not equally well be
founded on standards implicit in the decided cases holding stated
combinations of factors indicating legal fault to be contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
In so far as the standard of conduct of the guest, under the
doctrine of assumption of risk, may be higher than that of the
reasonably prudent man (as in Wisconsin under the rule of
Scorv v. LaFave)35 there seems no social justification for a
distinction between the requirement of care owed to the host by
a guest, and that owed by the guest to the third party whose
negligence concurs with that of the host to cause an accident. If
the guest knows of circumstances such that as a reasonably prudent
man he ought to protest or leave the car, he ought to have no
cause of action in any event; if he has no such knowledge he ought
not to be precluded from recovery as to anyone. The social justification of the doctrine, also, is conditioned by the factor that thus
far, at least, it has been impossible to tell what the standard of care
of the guest ought to be, if it ought to be other than that of a
reasonably prudent man.
The effect of the doctrine on the fair and intelligent analysis
of the issues by the jury is, of course, of paramount social importance. The standard method of procedure in presenting the
defenses in the field of master and servant has been to present
instructions to the jury on both assumption of risk and conM(1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 643.
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tributory negligence, 360 and the same rule has been followed in
the cases relating to the automobile guest.3"" Two issues bottomed
upon substantially the same standard of care are thus presented
to the jury. As a practical factor in making a general determination of social responsibility it may clearly be academic to make
a distinction between the use of the phrase "assumption of risk"
and "contributory negligence" in the verbiage handed to jurors
(and all too often disregarded, as every practitioner knows) for
the purpose of assisting them to come to an intelligent conclusion
as to liability in any case. The niceties of legal terminology too
complicated to be understood by the courts can hardly be significant to the average jury, especially since, as Labatt has suggested,
"An act which changes its quality completely, according as the
servant [plaintiff in other cases involving the doctrine] is or is not
aware of the physical consequences which it may entail, is, we
think, a conception altogether too subtle and refined to be comprehended by the average juror."3 62 To instruct that recovery is
precluded where plaintiff is guilty of "negligence contributing to
the injury" will be equally meaningful to the jurors, whether they
be also instructed that recovery may be denied because the plaintiff "knowingly assumed the risk."
The conception of the doctrine as a limitation on the right to
recovery, based on the conduct of the plaintiff, presents complex
problems. Present application of the volenti concept finds no
basis in the older cases, especially those in England, in which it
is suggested that the rule was not intended to apply where negligence of the defendant was conceded, when litigants sought to
apply the doctrine as a defense based upon the conduct of the
plaintiff. 36 3 Use of the term in this frame of reference has been
36 4
rejected also in a few jurisdictions here.
But the concept has been generally recognized in American
jurisdictions as a doctrine separate and independent from contributory negligence. Generally it has been conceived as a distinct
3
6OLabatt, Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence, (1897)
31 Am.
L. Rev. 667, 683.
361
Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491.
3623 Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3624.
363See 1 Bevan, Negligence (1928) 796; Pollock, The Law of Torts
(1923) 169, 170. Bramwell, J., in Smith v. Baker and Sons [1891] A. C. 325,
60 L. J. Q. B. 683, 65 L. T. 467, 55 3. P. 660, 7 T. L. R. 679; Dulieu v.
White and Sons, [1901] 2 K. B. 669, 70 L. J. K. B. 837, 85 L. T. 126, 17
T. L. R. 555; Dann v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 108 L. J. K. B. 225,
160 L. T. 433, 55 T. L. R. 297.
364Cf., e.g., Woodman v. Peck, (1939) 9 N. H. 292, 7 A. (2d) 251;
Reed v. Zellers (1933) 273 Ill. App. 18.
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limitation on the duty of the defendant, based on plaintiff's voluntary assumption of a known and appreciated danger. Logically, it
seems clearly unjustifiable, not only because it is impossible to
make any conceptual distinction between this rule and that of
contributory negligence, but because the standard of conduct under
each doctrine seems essentially to have been the same, and the
variance in the effect of such conduct when conditioned by other
legal principles impinging upon one doctrine or the other has on
the whole been unfortunate. With a more complete understanding
of the implications of the doctrine, it seems probable that courts
will cease attempting to separate the inseparable and where circumstances require, classify indisputable legal fault on the part
of a plaintiff, arising from whatever cause and in whatever field,
as contributory negligence as a matter of law.
(Concluded)

